Constitutional Court: In and by itself, an impending long prison sentence does not give grounds for jail due to risk of absconding. The courts must carefully weigh all circumstances and respect the rights of the accused.
Pre-trial detention – i.e., depriving the charged person of their personal liberty even before their final conviction – is among the most severe interferences by the state with individuals’ lives. Consequently, stringent conditions under the law must be met and all circumstances of each case must be carefully weighed before someone can be sent to jail. The Constitutional Court as the guardian of constitutionality has repeatedly scrutinized decisions whereby the general courts ordered pre-trial detention to ensure that no disproportionate infringement of fundamental rights and liberties occurs. In its recent ruling IV. ÚS 170/25, the Constitutional Court again addressed one of the grounds for pre-trial detention, known as risk of absconding, and confirmed that the mere prospect of severe punishment is not enough, in and by itself, to justify detention on such grounds.
Detention due to risk of absconding is governed by Sec. 67 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to this provision, a person charged with a crime may be remanded if their actions or other specific circumstances give legitimate concern that the person may abscond or go into hiding so as to escape criminal prosecution or punishment. The law goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of certain circumstances which may justify such concerns, among them the impossibility of determining the identity of the charged person on the spot, the absence of a permanent place of residence, or, as mentioned above, the prospect of particularly severe punishment.
In the ruling at hand, the Constitutional Court focused on the interpretation of that last item as a justification for the risk of absconding. The court highlighted that while a strictly semantic interpretation might lead one to conclude that the threat of a long prison sentence automatically gives cause to fear that the accused person might abscond to avoid a criminal trial, such an interpretation would be an undue simplification and in fact unconstitutional. In this respect, the Constitutional Court pointed to its own previous decisions according to which the prospect of severe punishment must be weighed in conjunction with all other circumstances of the given case, and in particular the arguments brought by the accused themselves.
In the particular case which the Constitutional Court reviewed here, the remandee was accused of murder, a felony for which he faced imprisonment of 15–20 years or exceptional punishment (to reflect the aggravated nature of the deed) of life imprisonment or 20–30 years in prison. It was the severity of this potential punishment that made the general courts conclude that there was sufficient cause to keep the accused person in jail. The Constitutional Court rejected this conclusion. It found that the courts had failed to duly reflect the arguments of the accused, and (with the exception of the penalty threshold) presented no compelling grounds for continued pre-trial detention.
In this respect, the Constitutional Court pointed to what is known as the doctrine of more compelling grounds which states that the longer the pre-trial detention, the weightier and more persuasive the justification must be for keeping the accused behind bars. Arguments put forth originally when criminal prosecution of the given person began may have been legitimate then, but can become insufficient over time. In the case at hand, the courts had reiterated the same arguments (severity of the crime and thus of the impending penalty) over and over again, without ever considering the relevant circumstances, and the arguments put forth by the accused.
The Constitutional Court went on to stress that pre-trial detention is an extreme means to ensure that the purpose of the criminal trial will be achieved and must not be applied in excess, especially if a person has been remanded for a lengthy period. Prosecutors and courts must deliberate whether the purpose of pre-trial detention might not be achieved also by applying more lenient measures – alternatives to jail, such as a pledge by the accused to return for trial, supervision by a probation officer, or release on bail. In the case at hand, the general courts had entirely neglected the option of using such means in lieu of pre-trial detention.
We may summarize that Constitutional Court ruling IV. ÚS 170/25 provides welcome precision for reviewing whether the criteria for imposing pre-trial detention due to risk of absconding are fulfilled. The court is making clear that the expectation of a severe penalty must not be the sole and automatic reason for depriving the accused of their personal liberty. When deciding on whether to remand the accused, the courts must carefully weigh all relevant circumstances, including the arguments of the accused, and must apply the doctrine of more compelling grounds, especially if the accused has already been in jail for an extended period of time. In addition, the option to replace pre-trial detention with more lenient measures must always be examined. In this manner, the ruling bolsters the protection of personal liberty and emphasizes the principle of proportionality which must be observed when the state interferes in criminal proceedings with the fundamental freedoms of the individual.
Source:
Czech Constitutional Court ruling IV. ÚS 170/25
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 141/1961 Coll.)